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I. Introduction 
Economic growth is the fundamental measurement that assesses a country’s productive 
capacity in terms of goods and services. It is conventionally estimated using the percent rate of 
increase in GDP per capita and is correlated with numerous factors in society, among which 
include quality of life. For example, one application of GDP per capita is as a primary indicator 
of standard of living. However, although GDP per capita is a reliable determinant of the level of 
development in a country, it is certainly not the only way to measure well-being. For instance, it 
fails to capture many important aspects of human welfare including health, education, and 
culture.  
Religion is a prominent dimension of culture that can be a significant factor in one’s 
quality of life. However, it is often overlooked as a potential determinant of economic growth. 
Economists have been trying to fill this gap. In the early 1970’s, Simon Kuznets, winner of the 
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1971, wrote an article highlighting his findings and reflections of 
modern economic growth. Of the six characteristics of modern economic growth that he 
recognized, secularization was cited as a means of changing ideology in society over time and 
thus as an indirect cause of economic growth (Kuznets 1973). In this case, secularization is a 
separation of a society from religious or spiritual values or influence. A result is the restriction of 
the role of religion in modern societies.   
This project comprises an exploration of the relationship between monthly attendance at 
church services and economic growth across several countries. The goal of my research project 
is to partially replicate the findings of two leading authors in this field, Robert J. Barro and 
Rachel M. McCleary (2003). I will also extend their work to cover the time period from 1999-
2012, as they examined data from 1981 to 1999.  
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II. Background 
A. Contemporary Literature 
Barro and McCleary (2003) begin with the observation that economic growth has usually 
been explained by a narrow set of economic variables. They argue that a more successful 
explanation of economic growth would include broader social and cultural dimensions. As a 
significant factor of culture, they note that religion influences character traits such as honesty and 
willingness to work. Thus, their purpose was to analyze religion as it relates to rates of economic 
growth. More specifically, the authors quantified this relationship using two main measures of 
religiosity: religious beliefs, represented by beliefs in heaven and in hell, and religious 
belonging, measured by monthly attendance at church services. 
Barro and McCleary studied a dataset on a broad panel of countries that contained an 
array of economic, political, and social indicators. They also gathered data on measures of 
religiosity primarily from the World Values Survey. As for their empirical framework, the 
dependent variable in their regression model was the growth rate of GDP per capita over three 
separate four- to five-year time periods, while the independent variables included numerous 
social, economic, and political indicators, in addition to their measures of religiosity.  
Focusing on a sample of 41 countries, the authors found that while religious beliefs affect 
economic growth positively, church attendance produces the opposite effect. The first 
relationship is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, which depict religious beliefs in heaven and hell, 
respectively.1 According to Barro and McCleary, “Growth depends on the extent of believing 
relative to belonging” (2003, p.760). In accordance with their original hypothesis, they see that 
because greater religious beliefs instill productivity-enhancing aspects of individual behavior in a 
                                                          
1 Figures 1-4 were taken from Barro and McCleary (2003).  
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person, growth is stimulated. According to the authors, since religious beliefs in general tend to 
influence personal traits, such as honesty and willingness to work, economic performance is 
enhanced. 
Figure 12 
 
Figure 2 
 
                                                          
2 One may look at the horizontal axis and wonder how beliefs in heaven or hell can be negative. The authors simply 
transformed the x-axis by normalizing the values to have a zero mean. 
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 Barro and McCleary’s second finding, that economic growth reacts negatively to monthly 
church attendance, is shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. In their regressions, Barro and McCleary 
hold the variables denoting belief in heaven and belief in hell constant.3 In theory, as church 
attendance increases, economic growth decreases, and vice versa. The authors reason that growth 
is depressed by increased church attendance because of their fundamental view of the market for 
religion. While beliefs can be considered the output of the religion sector, higher church 
attendance signifies a larger use of religious resources, as attendance measures the inputs in this 
sector. 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 This is noted under the graph titles in Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 
 
However, there arises an unresolved issue in thinking about the religion sector this way. 
Religious individuals could argue that beliefs are the input in the religion sector, while church 
attendance acts as the output—the reverse of what Barro and McCleary believe. More 
specifically, an individual could self-develop certain religious beliefs and then wish to foster 
them through attendance at church. There are many purposes of religious services, especially 
depending on culture and religious denomination, but certainly one basic, common objective is 
to help grow one’s beliefs and values.  
As clarification, Torry (2014, p. 55) broadly describes “a ‘sector’ as a way to categorize 
organizations.” In light of this definition, one can think of the religion sector as encompassing all 
religious organizations, or churches. Recognizing that it may be more accurate to categorize 
organizations based on their purpose, Mullins (2005) claims that there are five distinct categories 
of organizations, including economic, protective, associative, public service, and religious 
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organizations. Therefore, religious organizations occupy their own category because they are 
clearly defined in that worship is their core purpose. 
McCleary and Barro (2006) is an extension of their previous work in the sectors of 
religion and economics. The importance of this paper lies its examination of religion as both a 
dependent and an independent variable. When considering religion as a dependent variable, 
McCleary and Barro noted: “a central question is how economic development and political 
institutions affect religious participation and beliefs” (2006, p. 49). Thus, the theories are divided 
into demand-side and supply-side models. The secularization hypothesis is the historically 
popular demand-side view, arguing that economic growth negatively affects religion by reducing 
religious beliefs as well as participation in religious services. Regarding the supply-side, the 
religion market model explains that the nature of the religion product is affected by government 
regulation and competition among religion providers.  
As the independent variable, McCleary and Barro (2006) describe religion as fostering 
personality traits that influencing economic outcomes, as mentioned in Barro and McCleary 
(2003). Therefore, a greater degree of religiosity could encourage economic growth. They went 
on to quantitatively analyze their same theories from 2003 in order to study the various 
relationships between religion and rates of economic growth. Both of their papers enabled me to 
gain greater insight as to how the former influence the latter as well as the implications this 
relationship has in the broader context of the everyday world. However, it was also critical to 
more clearly understand an even more extensive aspect of the subject of religion and economic 
growth—that is, its fundamental origin. 
B. Weber & The Protestant Ethic 
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The genesis of capitalism has had implications over time. As noted by Weber (2009), 
German economic historian Werner Sombart distinguishes two important principles by which 
economic history has evolved. The first is the satisfaction of needs, which he explains this as 
corresponding to economic traditionalism (Weber 2009). Furthermore, Parsons (1928) says that 
these human needs are fixed for each individual, based on one’s social status. Sombart’s second 
principle was acquisition. This concept played a significant role in the understanding of the spirit 
of capitalism. That is, in early capitalist societies the leading principle was that the acquisition of 
money was considered an end in itself.  
Asceticism is a lifestyle that is characterized by: “the practice of the denial of physical or 
psychological desires in order to attain a spiritual ideal or goal” (“Asceticism…” 2013, p.1). 
Through this lens, the pursuit of wealth is inherently bad. On the other hand, Protestants believed 
in an “inner-worldly” asceticism, or: “the concentration of human behavior upon activities 
leading to salvation within the context of the everyday world” (Elton 1963).  Weber says, “It 
refers basically to the idea that the highest form of moral obligation of the individual is to fulfil 
his duty in worldly affairs” (2005, p. xii). Weber (2009) also explains that it is not religion, per 
se, that affects economic activity, but this worldly asceticism of Protestants. He continues, saying 
that asceticism characterized by traditionalism and habit does not stimulate capitalism. Since the 
fulfillment of obligations on Earth was the primary way to prove religious merit, capitalism 
became more widely accepted and began to lose its notoriety as solely a ceaseless quest for profit 
(Weber 2009).  
Weber adds, “capitalism’s relationship to the religious powers could have been exactly 
parallel—namely, a coalition between capitalism and religious belief tended to burst asunder the 
old economic traditionalism” (2009, p. 85). This stemmed from Weber’s observation that 
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northern Europe and America experienced a significant level of economic prosperity a century 
ago primarily because of the work ethic of those that were followers of Protestantism. Goldstone 
(2000), however, attributes this phenomenon to the establishment of a Newtonian culture in 
England, which promulgated a mechanical view of the world. He claims, “Only in Protestant 
Europe was the entire corpus of classical thinking called into question…And only in England, 
for at least a generation ahead of any other nation in Europe, did a Newtonian culture—featuring 
a mechanistic world-view, belief in fundamental, discoverable laws of nature, and the ability of 
man to reshape his world by using those laws—take hold” (Goldstone 2000, p. 184).  
Nevertheless, the Protestant ethic is defined in sociological theory as: “the value attached 
to hard work, thrift, and efficiency in one’s worldly calling, which, especially in the Calvinist 
view, were deemed signs of an individual’s election, or eternal salvation” (“Protestant Ethic…” 
2015, p. 1). Barro and McCleary reference this concept when they state that religious beliefs 
positively affect economic growth. Protestant values influence traits associated with one’s work 
life, thereby enriching economic performance. This caused a growing rationalization through 
which the supernatural was no longer necessary in explaining the world because science could 
(Gill 2001). Goldstone references this occurance in his explanation of the rise of the West, 
stating, “Only by the late seventeenth century in England could the entire elite culture agree that 
‘the ancient understanding of the natural world bears little or no relation to our own’” (2000, p. 
183). Norris and Inglehart (2004) also allude to this Weberian claim regarding the rationality of 
belief systems, suggesting that this trend ultimately led to the decline in the strength of religious 
organizations. However, Barro and McCleary recognize the problem of reverse causation in their 
study, saying, “To isolate the effects of religiosity on economic growth, we have to deal with the 
possibility of reverse effects from economic development to religion” (2003, p. 760). They do 
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this through the use of various instrumental variables for religion, namely the presence of a state 
religion, state regulation of religion, and religious pluralism. These variables will be explained in 
more depth in the data portion of this paper.  
C. Other Theories 
The common view of the relationship between religion and economic growth thus 
became summarized by the “secularization hypothesis.” This states that as societies progress in 
terms of modernization and rationalization, religion loses its significance in aspects of social life 
and governance. In other words, economic growth has a negative effect on religion. Weber cites 
Germany as an example, noting that “wherever a relationship between business activity and 
religious belief exists, it turns out to be a negative one… People who are saturated by the 
capitalist spirit today tend to be indifferent, if not openly hostile, to religion” (2009, p. 83). 
Although this powerful theory has prevailed over time, it is being challenged as of late. 
Several other authors contribute competing theories regarding the relationship between 
religion and economic growth. One such hypothesis, expanded by Chaves & Cann (1992), 
involves state regulation of religion. Measuring this empirically, they claimed that greater state 
regulation of religion, which was primarily measured by whether the government appoints or 
approves church leaders, decreased the efficiency of religion providers. Consequently, church 
attendance decreased as well. In summary, the conclusion of this theory is that state involvement 
tends to interfere with church activities and, in a broad sense, decreases religion.  
It is important to note that based on relevant literature, this “efficiency” seems to be 
largely open to interpretation. According to Salvatore and LeVine (2005), the efficiency of a 
religion provider could be described through the delivery of public goods. They view voluntary 
religious organizations, or those not regulated by the state, “as efficient providers of local public 
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goods in the absence of government provision.” Similarly, Shah, Larbi, and Batley (2007) 
attempt to explain the efficiency in terms of serving the public. In comparison to similar for-
profit and governmental services, they say: “Religious providers hired qualified workers more 
cheaply and were more likely to provide pro-poor services and to charge lower prices, with 
similar quality of care” (Shah, Larbi, and Batley 2007, p. 13). In general, religion providers’ 
efficiency is measured by their provision of public services, and more specifically, in terms of 
output per unit of input. Although it is not commonly stated in the literature, one could 
intuitively believe that efficiency could also depend on the quality with which the duties of the 
provider are conducted. The challenge, however, lies in quantitatively measuring such a factor.  
Another theory, inspired by Adam Smith, involves religious pluralism and focuses on 
market or supply-side forces and competition among providers of religion.4 Under the 
assumption that the notion of supply-side is broadly defined as the quantity and/or quality with 
which goods and services are produced, the stimulation of growth, in this case, involves how 
religious products (primarily church services) are provided. This theory claims that a greater 
diversity of religions promotes greater competition in the religion market. This creates a better 
quality “religion product,” as Barro and McCleary (2003) put it, and thus leads to greater 
religious participation and beliefs. 
III. Partial Replication and Extension 
A. Data 
The data used in this study came from two main sources: the World Bank and the World 
Values Survey (WVS).5 The latter database allowed me to retrieve data from surveys conducted 
                                                          
4 Aside from Smith (1791), other authors also contributed to this concept, including (Stark and Bainbridge 1987), 
(Finke and Stark 1992), (Iannaccone 1991), and (Finke and Iannaccone 1993). 
5 This is an organization that uses a common questionnaire to evaluate various values, especially religious values, 
and their effect on the social and political lives of people across the world. 
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to explore dimensions of religiosity by country. I used one of the measures (church attendance) 
that Barro and McCleary employed.  
Unlike these authors, I did not consider religious beliefs as a variable affecting economic 
growth in this study because of the lack of consistency with which the questions were asked in 
the World Values Survey. For example, in Wave 4, questions were asked about both church 
attendance and religious beliefs in heaven and in hell. In the next wave that covered the time 
period from 2005-2009, however, the survey did not ask a question about one’s belief in heaven 
or in hell. Furthermore, while the survey in Wave 6 did ask about attendance at religious services 
and belief in hell, it left out the question regarding belief in heaven. This left several gaps in my 
dataset that would have been very difficult to try and reconstruct from different sources. 
It was important to analyze three waves of the World Values Survey because the 
objective of this project is to examine how these variables affected economic growth across time. 
Hypothetically, one might suggest omitting this wave because it did not include data on religious 
beliefs. However, this omission would cause discontinuity in the dataset. It was also beneficial to 
use data covering a 16-year time period (Waves 4, 5, and 6) rather than an 11-year time period 
(Waves 4 and 6 only). If only considering Waves 4 and 6, still only church attendance and belief 
in hell could be used as measures of religiosity because there is no question regarding belief in 
heaven in Wave 6. Without belief in heaven, belief in hell is not an adequate way to gauge one's 
religiosity. For example, different religions believe many different things regarding an after-life. 
Although a similar argument could be made regarding church attendance, this variable is more 
telling than one’s belief in hell. 
The measure of religiosity, monthly church attendance, came from the WVS. One 
question in the survey regarded the frequency with which one attends religious services. The 
14 
responses that could be selected ranged from “more than once a week” to “never/practically 
never.” Therefore, I combined the percentages from the “more than once a week,” “once a 
week,” and “once a month” categories for each respective country and labeled that sum as 
monthly church attendance.  
There have been six different “waves,” or time periods, during which the survey has been 
conducted, beginning in 1981 and ending in 2014. Because Barro and McCleary studied the 
information gathered from the first three waves, I analyzed data from the last three waves of the 
survey, with my data extending from 1999 to 2012 and covering 12 different countries. 
The WVS does not report responses year-by-year. That is, the data is gathered over 
certain ranges of time: 1999-2004, 2005-2010, and 2011-2014. In other words, the survey was 
conducted over a series of time periods. This created a problem in aligning the dependent 
variable in the present study, which was the log of GDP per capita, with the independent 
variables that were set up in panel data format. As a solution, I assumed the same value of 
monthly church attendance for each respective country for each year in a given time period. As 
an example, the average monthly church attendance in Argentina during the 1999-2004 time 
period was 42.8%. Therefore, I made the presumption that it was 42.8% in 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, and 2004, and did the same for each of the 12 countries in the sample. These 
countries were Argentina, Chile, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, and the United States. Because of this issue, I created two dummy variables 
(wave1 and wave2) to account for time in my estimation. Therefore, wave1 signifies the time 
period from 1999-2004, wave2 signifies the time period from 2005-2010, which leaves the third 
wave to cover 2010-2012. Other dummy variables were those denoting religious shares of the 
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population, including Hinduism, Judaism, Islam, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, and an “Other” 
category. 
Two instrumental religion variables included were dummy variables for the presence of a 
state religion and state regulation of religion. For clarification, the instrumental variable 
approach, according to Woolridge, “leaves the unobserved variable in the error term, but rather 
than estimating the model by OLS, it uses an estimation method that recognizes the presence of 
the omitted variable” (2013, p. 513). In other words, it is used to estimate causal relationships 
and provides a way to obtain consistent parameter estimates. Barro and McCleary (2003) 
theorized that the former lowered religious pluralism and thus resulted in decreased religious 
participation. The latter, they believed, interfered with religious activity and generated lower 
rates of church attendance. Another instrumental variable I used represented religious pluralism, 
based on Herfindahl6 indexes for shares of religion. Because the authors shared the values of 
these variables in their paper, I used them in order to most closely imitate their study.  
The economic and demographic measures were gathered from the World Bank and 
served as my independent variables. Because it’s one of the variables of most interest in this 
research, GDP per capita was among them. Life expectancy at birth and the urbanization rate 
were used because as Barro and McCleary (2003, p. 2) state: “Development typically features 
not only rising per capita incomes but also higher levels of education7, urbanization, and life 
expectancy, and lower levels of fertility.” Next, the shares of the population under age 15 and 
over age 65 were relevant because Barro and McCleary (2003, p. 2) went on to say: “The 
                                                          
6 The Herfindal index is the sum of the squares of the population fractions belonging to each religion. It can be 
interpreted as the probability that two randomly-selected persons in a country belong to the same religion.  
7 Due to a lack of data on educational attainment age 25+ for 1999-2012 from the World Bank, this variable was 
omitted from my model.  
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combined effects from higher life expectancy and lower fertility imply a shift in the age structure 
toward the old and away from the young.”  
B. Model 
In a section of their paper, Barro and McCleary state: “As a prelude to our analysis of the 
effects of religion on economic growth, we estimated panel systems in which the dependent 
variables are country-averages of answers to survey questions about attendance at religious 
services and religious beliefs” (2003, p. 765). Using their research as a guideline, I first ran 
various regressions to obtain partial correlations to help understand how monthly church 
attendance co-varies with the explanatory variables. Essentially flipping the position of the 
dependent and independent variables, I then ran the main regression of my research, with GDP 
per capita as the former and church attendance, among other measures, included in the latter. 
This allowed me to understand the effect that monthly attendance at religious services on GDP 
per capita across the countries in this study.  
I employed a cross-national panel estimation method. Including both a cross-sectional 
and a time series dimension, my data allowed me to observe the behavior of the same multiple 
countries over a period of time. The basic advantages of using panel data was that one can 
control for characteristics certain variables that cannot be observed. It also allows for the study of 
lags in behavior or in the effects of decision-making. However, a significant disadvantage of 
panel data concerns difficulty in data collection. As Woolridge explains, “Because panel data 
require replication of the same units over time, panel data sets… are more difficult to obtain than 
pooled cross sections” (2013, p. 11). This issue explains the small number of countries studied in 
this project.  
 The general model for more than two time periods is as follows: 
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Equation 1 
itiitkkitittktit uaxxxdkdy   ......2 221121   ,  Ii ,..,2,1 and Tt ,..,2,1  
where i  stands for the country, t  stands for the time period, td2  is a dummy variable that 
equals one when 2t  and zero when t equals anything other than 2 (it does not change across i
), ia  is a variable that captures all unobserved time-constant factors that affect ity , and itu  is the 
idiosyncratic error term that represents unobserved factors that change over time and affect ity . 
Given this, my models were as follows: 
Equation 2 
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where 1wave  marks the time period 1999-2004, 2wave marks the time period 2005-2010, 
lgdppercap  is the log of GDP per capita, urban  is the urbanization rate (as a percentage of total 
population), expect is the life expectancy at birth (in years), 15_pop is the share of the 
population under age 15 (as a percentage of total population), 65_pop is the share of the 
population over age 65 (as a percentage of total population), staterel  is a dummy variable for 
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the presence of a state religion, statereg  is a dummy variable for state regulation of religion,
plural  represents religious pluralism, Argentina through StatesUnited _ are dummy variables 
representing the countries in the sample, and v  is the composite error (where itiit uav  ). 
These variables can also be referenced in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 
Variable Name Definition 
wave1 
 
Time period 1999-2004 
wave2 
 
Time period 2005-2010 
lgdppercap 
 
Log of GDP per capita 
urban 
Urbanization rate (as a percentage of total 
population) 
expect 
 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 
pop_15 
Share of the population under age 15 (as a 
percentage of total population) 
pop_65 
Share of the population over age 65 (as a 
percentage of total population) 
staterel 
Dummy variable for the presence of a state 
religion 
statereg 
Dummy variable for state regulation of 
religion 
plural 
Degree of religious pluralism, based on 
Herfindal Index 
Argentina through United_States 
Dummy variables for the countries in the 
sample 
v 
 
Composite error (where 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡) 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
A. Dependent Variable: Church Attendance 
 I first obtained the summary statistics of the variables, shown in Table 2. The means and 
standard deviations were comparable with those obtained by Barro and McCleary (2003). The 
variables that saw the greatest change in terms of the mean were GDP per capita and monthly 
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church attendance. This variation could be due to the fact that I had to include fewer countries in 
my analysis than Barro and McCleary because of lack of available data. In turn, the authors were 
included more countries that had higher levels of GDP per capita, further affecting the mean. 
Table 2 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
church 156 .411 .213 .031 .748 
lgdppercap 156 1.360 .144 .978 1.559 
urban 156 .717 .180 .276 .919 
expect 156 73.939 7.785 51.557 83.096 
pop_15 156 .243 .067 .131 .342 
pop_65 156 .098 .055 .027 .244 
staterel8 156 .333 .473 0 1 
statereg 156 .417 .495 0 1 
plural9 156 .257 .228 0 1 
 
The cross-national panel estimations from Equation 2 and Equation 3 yielded the results 
found in the following table: 
Table 3 
Dependent Variable: church 
 
Independent 
variables 
[1] [2] 
lgdppercap .167 
(.145) 
.238* 
(.144) 
urban .540** 
(.005) 
- 
expect -.005 
(.235) 
-.007 
(.005) 
pop_15 .772 
(.484) 
.411 
(.465) 
pop_65 -.009 .093 
                                                          
8 The minimum and maximum values for staterel and statereg range from 0 to 1 because they are dummy variables. 
9 The minimum and maximum value for plural ranges from 0 to 1 because this variable is based on an index with 
values between 0 and 1. 
20 
(.117) (.110) 
staterel10 0 - 
statereg 0 - 
plural 0 - 
wave1 .081*** 
(.016) 
.075*** 
(.016) 
wave2 .027** 
(.010) 
.023** 
(.010) 
Intercept -.044 
(.509) 
.417 
(.475) 
Observations 
R2 
          within 
          between 
          overall 
156 
.447 
.020 
.031 
156 
.426 
.473 
.422 
corr(ui, Xb) -.288 .449 
        
        *=significant at the 10% level 
        **=significant at the 5% level 
        ***= significant at the 1% level 
 
In the estimation of the first regression (Equation 2), three variables were statistically 
significant. These were urban (significant at the 10% level), wave1 (significant at the 1% level), 
and wave2 (significant at the 10% level).  In considering the coefficient on lgdppercap, I found 
that there was a positive relationship between monthly church attendance and GDP per capita 
across countries, as Barro and McCleary had found as well. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 
3, the errors were negatively correlated with the regressors by a value of .288. This indicates that 
there is an endogeneity problem within this model. It is also important to note that the variables 
staterel, statereg, and plural were omitted from the Equation 2 due to multicollinearity. 
                                                          
10 staterel, statereg, and plural were omitted because of multicollinearity. 
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 In Equation 3, staterel, statereg, and plural were again omitted for the above reason. 
Furthermore, urban was excluded from the equation in order to see the change that would result 
after omitting the most significant variable (besides the dummy variables for time: wave1 and 
wave2). One consequence of doing this is that the equation likely suffers from omitted variable 
bias. Nonetheless, Equation 3 was simply a test to see the change as a result of the omission of 
urban. As a result, lgdppercap became statistically significant at the 10% level. The variables 
wave1 and wave2 remained significant at their respective levels. Moreover, the coefficient on 
lgdppercap rose by a small amount, now meaning that a one-unit increase in GDP per capita 
increases monthly church attendance by approximately 23.8 percentage points, given that this is 
a log-level model. Finally, the correlation between the error and the regressors became positive 
(0.449). While this interpretation and the other correlations in the analysis are useful, they do not 
imply any direct causations.  
B. Estimation Concerns 
 Multicollinearity is defined as high, but not perfect, correlation between two or more 
independent variables. Therefore, the estimation in this study does not violate Assumption 
MLR.3, which is the requirement that there is no perfect collinearity, or no exact linear 
relationships among the independent variables (Woolridge 2013). A usual sign of 
multicollinearity is an R2 value that is close to one. One common cause of this issue is improper 
dummy coding. Another possible cause of multicollinearity is using the same or nearly the same 
variable twice. This doesn’t seem to be the problem because although the presence of a state 
religion and state regulation of religion are variables that are similar in concept, they are not the 
same measurement. 
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 In this case, the relatively small sample size (156 observations) in this study could have 
caused the large sampling variance )).ˆ(( jVar   The best way to reduce variances of unbiased 
estimators is to collect more data. Unfortunately, data limitations disallowed this as a possibility 
in this case. Other independent variables from the model could have been dropped in an attempt 
to minimize the issue, but this could, in turn, have led to omitted variable bias. This arises in the 
estimators as a result of omitting a relevant variable from a regression equation (Woolridge 
2013). This problem of underspecifying the model generally causes the estimators to be biased. 
A closely related error to this is functional form misspecification. According to 
Woolridge, “A multiple regression model suffers from functional form misspecification when it 
does not properly account for the relationship between the dependent and the observed 
explanatory variable” (2013, p. 304). In other words, this occurs when a model has omitted 
functions of the explanatory variables (such as quadratics), or uses the wrong functions of either 
the dependent variable or some explanatory variables. One way to check if certain explanatory 
variables should appear as squares of higher-order terms is by manually testing whether such 
terms can be excluded from the regression. Otherwise, the general test for functional form 
misspecification is the Ramsey regression specification error test (RESET). However, this 
specific test is not compatible with panel data.  
A second common issue in regression analysis is heteroskedasticity. Violating 
Assumption MLR.5, this occurs when the error does not have the same variance given any 
values of the explanatory variables. In theory: 2
1 ),...,|( kxxuVar (Woolridge 2013).  As a 
result, the estimators remain unbiased and consistent because to prove this only requires MLR.1 
– MLR.4. However, as a consequence of heteroskedasticity, the estimators are no longer the best, 
linear, unbiased estimators (BLUE) because they are no longer efficient.  
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Among the several methods for testing heteroskedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test 
was used in this study: 
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Because cF  , null hypothesis was not rejected at the 5% level of significance. This indicates 
that there was not a heteroskedasticity problem in the first regression corresponding to Equation 
2, as an example, according to the BP test. Furthermore, if heteroskedasticity depended only 
upon certain independent variables in this case, the BP test could have been modified. There are 
several tests for heteroskedasticity and modifications of these tests to check for this issue during 
the post-estimation process.  
C. Dependent Variable: GDP per capita 
The main regression of this study is depicted in Equation 4.  In this model, GDP per 
capita is the dependent variable and church attendance was among the independent variables.  
Equation 4  
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 This estimation in this study produced the results: 
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Table 4 
 
Dependent variable: lgdppercap 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
church -.414 
(.562) 
urban .945 
(.551) 
expect -.010 
(.005) 
pop_15 -1.056 
(.662) 
pop_65 .154 
(.120) 
staterel 5.761 
(4.012) 
statereg -1.399 
(.771) 
plural 9.214 
(6.294) 
wave111 0 
wave2 -.011 
(.008) 
hindu .040 
(.033) 
jew -.040 
(.041) 
muslim -.034 
(.021) 
                                                          
11 The variable wave1 was omitted because of multicollinearity. 
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orthodox12 0 
other 0 
protestant 0 
Intercept -4.002 
(3.765) 
Observations 
R2 
          within 
          between 
          overall 
36 
.874 
1.000 
.994 
 
V. Discussion 
A. Conditions 
Before discussing my results and comparing with those of Barro and McCleary, I will 
first describe the circumstances under which this analysis was conducted. As a disclaimer, this 
analysis purposefully does not exactly parallel the authors’. First, in order to determine the effect 
that religion has on economic growth, these authors studied two main religious measures: 
monthly church attendance and religious beliefs (both in heaven and in hell). Due to difficulty in 
obtaining data on religious beliefs for the latest three waves of the World Values Survey, the 
present analysis considers only monthly attendance at religious services. 
 Barro and McCleary ran three sets of two regressions. For example, in their first they 
focused on the variables that described church attendance and belief in hell and the effect they 
had on GDP per capita. This model included the variables denoting religious shares of the 
population (Hinduism, Judaism, Islam, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, and an “Other” category) 
among other economic variables mentioned previously in this paper. They focused on the same 
                                                          
12 The variables orthodox, other, and protestant were also omitted because of multicollinearity. 
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variables in the second regression, but omitted the compositions of the population by religion. 
Their third and fourth regressions were similar in form, but focused on church attendance and 
belief in hell. In their fifth and sixth regressions they included all three of their measures of 
religiosity: church attendance, belief in hell, and belief in heaven. As can be gathered above, 
Barro and McCleary did not run a regression involving church attendance as the sole measure of 
religiosity. This is important to note because the regression analysis in my study only included 
this variable. 
B. Results and Comparison with Barro and McCleary (2003) 
Upon initial review, one can notice the sign of the coefficient on church in my analysis 
corresponded with that of Barro and McCleary’s in all of their regressions. This means that we 
both found monthly attendance at church services to have a negative effect on economic growth 
measured by GDP per capita. However, the magnitude of the coefficient differed between our 
analyses in that my result was much larger (-.414) than Barro and McCleary’s (which ranged 
from -.009 to -.016). The interpretation of this result says that if the share of the population in a 
country that goes to church monthly increases by one percentage point, the growth rate of GDP 
per capita is expected to decrease by approximately 41.4%, given that this is a log-level model. 
However, this result is unrealistic. Considering the standard error of the coefficient on church 
attendance, one can see that it’s larger than the coefficient itself. In other words, besides having 
no statistical significance, church attendance has no economic significance either. Therefore in 
this replicated study, church attendance is not important in explaining economic growth.  
In this statistical analysis, however, the most interesting result involved the degree of 
religious pluralism across countries over time. This is a substantial factor in explaining per capita 
GDP, as represented by the magnitude of the coefficient on the instrumental variable for 
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religious pluralism. A similar explanation applies for the variable representing the urbanization 
rate. However, because the present study mainly focuses on measures of religiosity, this would 
be an area to consider in future research. McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) explain that many 
economic papers fail to discuss the size of the coefficients and if the magnitudes are 
scientifically reasonable and important. So in this case, although the religious pluralism result 
was not statistically significant, it does have important implications in terms of economic 
significance.  
In short, Barro and McCleary explain religious pluralism as the degree of diversity within 
the religion market, or a measurement of “the diversity of adherence among major religions” 
(2003, p. 36). They note two key indicators of religious pluralism in their study: the presence of a 
state religion and regulation of the religion market. Barro and McCleary use Scandinavia as an 
example because this country has an established state church and therefore a low degree of 
religious pluralism (2003). The authors created measures of pluralism based on Herfindal indices 
for shares of religion. They explain that this type of index “can be interpreted as the probability 
that two randomly selected persons in a country (among those adhering to some religion) belong 
to the same religion” (Barro and McCleary 2003, p. 764). Barro and McCleary’s pluralism index, 
which is equal one minus the Herfindal index, is an indicator of religious diversity because it 
represents the probability that two people belong to different religions. Since the authors’ 
calculated measures were not time-dependent, they were used in this analysis. 
Religious pluralism has several implications as it relates to economic growth. In a study 
by Florida (2014), there is a correlation between religious diversity and economic productivity 
and competitiveness across many nations. Interestingly, he discovers, “Pluralism is tied up with 
the broad shift to a post-industrial knowledge-based economy, as it is positively correlated with 
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the share of workers in the creative class” (Florida 2014, p. 1). Moreover, this author goes on to 
note that pluralism is correlated with both total factor productivity (TFP) and entrepreneurship. 
Therefore, this link implies that religious diversity loosely translates into a diversity of ideas. 
This positively influences factors such as TFP and innovation, thus having a positive effect on 
economic growth in turn. 
Ashraf and Galor (2011) discover a similar pattern that involves religious pluralism and 
economic growth. They state: “the interplay between cultural assimilation and cultural diffusion 
has played a significant role in giving rise to differential patterns of economic development 
across the globe” (Ashraf and Galor 2011, p. i). In other words, a broad definition of diversity, 
which includes religious diversity, tends to spur economic growth among countries. A significant 
question, however, is whether or not this broad definition is sufficient. The answer to this has 
important consequences for this argument. Regardless, this idea challenges the common 
counterargument that diverse populations migrate towards wealthier areas of high productivity 
and economic growth rates (Florida 2011). It also tests the concept of the Protestant ethic. While 
Weber believes that the Great Divergence, or the phenomenon in which Europe and the 
Americas surpassed the rest of the world in terms of economic development, was instigated by 
Protestants’ work ethic and beliefs, Florida credits “a relative openness to other cultures” by 
these leading countries (2011, p. 1). Their most significant conclusion was that: “Proximity, 
openness, and diversity operate alongside technological innovation and human capital as the key 
engines of economic prosperity” (Florida 2011, p. 1).  
As a driver of growth, cultural diversity inspires a heightened awareness of differences 
which could contribute to creativity and progressiveness, specifically with respect to 
industrialization, as Ashraf and Galor (2011) suggest. Furthermore, diversity signals a wider 
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range of ideas and intellectualism. Therefore, this has important implications for religious 
diversity because religion is a principal dimension of culture. In short, religious pluralism should 
behave similarly in affecting economic growth because the same principles apply. A diversity of 
religions instills this same sense of openness and thus contributes to productivity via creativity in 
innovation. 
C. Estimation Concerns Associated with Barro and McCleary (2003) 
 According to Young, “A high degree of model uncertainty typically besets statistical 
research” (2009, p. 380). This seems to be especially true with regard to religion and economic 
growth, as Young presents a passionate critique of model uncertainty in sociological research 
with a focus on Barro and McCleary (2003). The author does this by also attempting to replicate 
their results.13 This led him to discover: “Small, sensible changes in their model specification 
produce large changes in the results: the results are inconsistent across time, and the instrumental 
variables strategy suffers from a weak instrument set” (Young 2009, p. 380).  
Throughout the paper, he emphasizes the problem of reverse causation between 
religiosity and economic growth that Barro and McCleary encounter. The latter claim that this is 
accounted for through the use of the instrumental variables in their model. They state, 
“Specifically, our study of religiosity suggest plausible instrumental variables that can be used to 
pin down the direction of causation from religion to economic performance, rather than the 
reverse” (Barro and McCleary 2003, p. 4). Young agrees with these authors in making an 
important distinction that a reliable instrument must influence religiosity without having an 
inherent correlation to economic growth. However, he also says that in their study, state religion 
and state regulation of religion are stronger as instrumental variables than religious pluralism. 
                                                          
13 He does this to the best of his ability. Young admits that he procured the dataset directly from Barro and 
McCleary because his attempts to recreate it from public sources ultimately proved unsuccessful. 
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Young argues that the latter actually is influenced by economic growth, mainly due to the fact 
that “rich countries tend to ‘import’ religious diversity from the poorer regions of the world” 
(Young 2009, p. 387). In other words, because people from countries with a low level of GDP 
per capita tend to migrate to wealthier nations, a variety of different religions often accompanies 
the influx of immigrants. Therefore, religious diversity can be caused by economic growth, 
making it a weaker instrumental variable. Regardless, the interesting role that religious pluralism 
plays in this unique analysis has been illustrated. 
Verhagen and Wagenmakers explain issues with replication in general. They explain that 
it’s unwise to base the success of a replication attempt solely on the comparison of p-values 
between the results because, “a difference in significance does not always indicate that the 
difference is significant” (2014, p. 2).14 While their overall aim is to raise awareness of proper 
statistical methods for drawing conclusions from data, they advocate a Bayesian test as one of 
the best ways to quantify the results of a replication attempt, specifically it success or failure. 
The authors explain: “Given that the original experiment showed a significant effect, this test 
addressed the question, ‘Is the effect from the replication attempt comparable to what was found 
before, or is it absent?’”(Verhagen and Wagenmakers 2014, p. 3). This is important because, 
among other advantages, it enables a researcher to consider the significance of a result in greater 
depth.  
Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2012) add that while Barro and McCleary’s study is fairly 
replicable, the results are not statistically robust. According to Woolridge, “a robust regression 
estimator is relatively insensitive to extreme observations” (2013, p. 334). In other words, it 
signifies the degree to which an estimator is resistant to outliers in the data. “In particular,” the 
                                                          
14 Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) credit this conclusion to (Gelman and Stern 2006) and (Nieuwenhuis, 
Forstmann, and Wagenmakers 2011). 
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authors determine, “we find no evidence that religious beliefs play a significant role in enhancing 
growth outcome. There is little evidence of a religion/growth nexus. At best, our findings suggest 
that there may be weak evidence for a negative effect of religious participation on growth” 
(Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan 2012, p. 1060). The partial replication in my research produced 
similar results in that the estimators were not robust and that there was only a weak relationship 
between attendance at church services and rates of economic growth across countries. The 
authors state that one of the problems in making a claim as significant as Barro and McCleary 
made is that the strength of the claim is usually not exhaustively analyzed. While some aspects 
of the claim are accurate, others many not have been looked into as thoroughly. In other words, 
there is not a very strong explanation for the results they received. In the case of Barro and 
McCleary, church attendance’s negative influence on economic growth seems to be framed as an 
aside, at best. 
D. Criticisms of Barro and McCleary (2003) 
To recall, Barro and McCleary believe that “growth depends on the extent of belief 
relative to belonging” (2003, p. 760). In other words, regular attendance at religious services 
increases an attendee’s beliefs and religious values, which in turn positively affects economic 
growth. These beliefs could promote traits such as honesty, loyalty, and hard work, each of 
which contribute to the productivity of a society, and even more, a nation. However, both the 
authors and I found that church attendance in itself has a negative impact on economic growth. 
There seems to be a variety of somewhat undeveloped reasons for this specific outcome. For 
example, Barro and McCleary admit: “organized religion—and, more specifically, attendance at 
religious services—would affect economic performance mostly indirectly, that is, through 
influences on the religious beliefs” (2003, p. 23). In other words, their theory for church 
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attendance’s net negative effect on economic growth is largely dependent how this variable 
affects religious beliefs.  
Therefore, a plausible, direct inference for the negative relationship between attendance 
and growth could involve the importance of organized religion in society, as Barro and 
McCleary briefly mention. They say, “For example, organized religion might influence laws and 
regulations that affect economic incentives. Adverse examples would be restrictions on credit 
and insurance markets and more general discouragement of the profit motive” (Barro and 
McCleary 2003, p. 772). This implies that the negative influence of church attendance on growth 
is has to do with the particular beliefs and values that are proclaimed at religious services. A last, 
and weaker hypothesis is that time spent at religious services takes time away from economic 
activities. This is not as strong an argument because a religious service is not that long in itself, 
relatively speaking. To put it another way, as a percentage of one’s day, religious services 
generally do not consume as much time as the time that a person spends at work, for example. In 
short, Barro and McCleary argue: “higher church attendance uses up time and resources, and 
eventually runs into diminishing returns. The ‘religion sector’, as they call it, can consume more 
than it yields” (“God, man and…” 2003, p. 1). 
VI. Further Direction 
In light of this, one direction one could take in extending this study is to solely focus on 
religious diversity as a potential determinant of economic growth. Similarly, as mentioned 
previously in this paper, one could look at the intriguing effect that the urbanization rate seems to 
have on GDP per capita. Moreover, Barro and McCleary (2003) suggest that more measures of 
religiosity should be included in such an analysis of economic growth. They encourage 
considering other variables in the World Values Survey, such as the degree to which one 
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considers him or herself a religious person, or whether or not someone is a member of a church 
or religious organization. One could also look at how much time people spend praying outside of 
church or on religious activities. This could help understand to what degree this time takes away 
from economic activities. Another interesting variable is the meaning of religion to a person. The 
question in the World Values Survey tries to gauge if it’s more about following religious 
tradition, or if it’s to acquire religious and moral values that we’ve already seen can influence 
economic growth. 
More generally, the strength of similar studies in the future should be examined more 
closely to determine their accuracy. That is, one might consider employing Verhagen and 
Wagenmaker’s (2014) Bayesian test to quantify the results of replication attempts. In addition, 
individual variables should be examined so one can ensure that his or her model is as accurate as 
possible. For instance, Young (2009) emphasizes the importance of instrumental variables as 
they relate to reverse causation between two variables. Both of these are important steps to take 
in ensuring the accuracy of a statistical analysis. However, one of the most important ideas is that 
of the difference between statistical and economic significance. The former primarily involves 
the decision-making process that leads one to either reject or fail to reject his or her null 
hypothesis, based on the p-values from one’s statistical analysis. On the other hand, the latter 
refers to the substantive and practical, or “real-world,” implications of a statistical result. 
McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) study this topic closely, unfortunately finding that economics 
textbooks and journals alike often fail to distinguish between statistical and economic 
significance. There is often much more emphasis placed on the former, leading to one-sided 
conclusions in many studies (McCloskey and Ziliak 1996). Therefore, this is an important issue 
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because ignoring the economic significance of a statistical result can have significant real-world 
consequences. 
VII. Conclusion 
 To conclude, this study was a partial replication and extension of Barro and McCleary’s 
(2003) research on the relationship between religion and economic growth. The results of the 
statistical analysis showed that monthly attendance at church services has a negative effect on 
economic growth, which was measured by GDP per capita. However, this result was neither 
statistically nor economically significant, unlike that of Barro and McCleary. Additionally, 
religious pluralism seems to have important implications for economic growth, as revealed by 
the magnitude of the coefficient on this variable. In the discussion between statistical and 
economic significance, this is an important thing for which to look because it implies 
significance of the latter form—something that is often overlooked in heavy statistical analyses 
but can have important implications in the broader context of the everyday world. It is 
hypothesized that the religious pluralism is loosely connected to GDP per capita through a 
causation chain involving a sense of openness, creativity, and innovation. All in all, this is a 
complex area of study that requires a very close examination of religiosity measures that have 
the potential to influence economic growth rates across countries and time. 
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